Open Access Journal Article

Welfare fragmented information effects: The cost-benefit analysis and Trade-offs

by Emna Trabelsi a, b,* orcid
a
University of Tunis, Higher Institute of Management of Tunis, Social and Economic Policy Analysis Laboratory. Tunisia.
b
University of Sousse, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences of Sousse. Tunisia.
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
JIE  2024, 22; 2(1), 22; https://doi.org/10.58567/jie02010001
Received: 5 January 2024 / Accepted: 24 February 2024 / Published Online: 27 February 2024
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Abstract

We offer an extensive analysis of the significance of information within the realm of Gaussian quadratic economies. We build upon the seminal papers of Morris and Shin (2002, 2007) and consider a signal game of incomplete information. Particularly, we question the suitability of partial transparency portrayed by fragmented information in addition to the private signal in terms of welfare effects. We can summarize our findings in two main points. First, fragmented information, in conjunction with a private signal, can reduce the reliance on public signals. Second, a conflicting effect arises between increasing full disclosure and increasing the precision of fragmented (semi-public) information when examining different complex scenarios, involving for example endogenous private information or imperfect correlated signals. For a critical threshold, an optimal communication strategy designed by fragmented information should be implemented whenever that kind of information is acquired at a high precision.

Keywords: Transparency; Semi-public information; Private information; Trade-off; Coordination games; Signal game with incomplete information;
Copyright: © 2024 by Trabelsi. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) (Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

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ACS Style
Trabelsi, E. Welfare fragmented information effects: The cost-benefit analysis and Trade-offs. Journal of Information Economics, 2024, 2, 22. https://doi.org/10.58567/jie02010001
AMA Style
Trabelsi E. Welfare fragmented information effects: The cost-benefit analysis and Trade-offs. Journal of Information Economics; 2024, 2(1):22. https://doi.org/10.58567/jie02010001
Chicago/Turabian Style
Trabelsi, Emna 2024. "Welfare fragmented information effects: The cost-benefit analysis and Trade-offs" Journal of Information Economics 2, no.1:22. https://doi.org/10.58567/jie02010001
APA style
Trabelsi, E. (2024). Welfare fragmented information effects: The cost-benefit analysis and Trade-offs. Journal of Information Economics, 2(1), 22. https://doi.org/10.58567/jie02010001

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