This paper examines the link between informality and corruption, two interlinked phenomena that have negative impacts on economic development. The paper presents a neoclassical model simulation that illustrates how informality can drive corruption in the economy, emphasizing the incentives for corruption in an economy with informal and formal sectors. The model provides insights into the mechanisms that promote corruption and how policymakers can reduce it through formalisation. The paper reviews the existing literature on informality and corruption, highlighting the empirical evidence and theoretical models that support the relationship between the two. The research finds that countries with larger informal sectors tend to have higher levels of corruption. The study contributes to the ongoing debate on how to reduce corruption and promote formalisation, which are crucial for sustainable economic growth.
Jackson, E. A. Informality as a Driving Force for Corruption in Economy: A Neoclassical Simulation. Economic Analysis Letters, 2023, 2, 26. https://doi.org/10.58567/eal02020008
Jackson E A. Informality as a Driving Force for Corruption in Economy: A Neoclassical Simulation. Economic Analysis Letters; 2023, 2(2):26. https://doi.org/10.58567/eal02020008
Jackson, Emerson A. 2023. "Informality as a Driving Force for Corruption in Economy: A Neoclassical Simulation" Economic Analysis Letters 2, no.2: 26. https://doi.org/10.58567/eal02020008
Jackson, E. A. (2023). Informality as a Driving Force for Corruption in Economy: A Neoclassical Simulation. Economic Analysis Letters, 2(2), 26. https://doi.org/10.58567/eal02020008
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