Exiting literature and central banks have recently raised concerns about the ominous overlooked threat of growing global debt, and its fundamental role in financial crises and economic instability. This paper develops and models an alternative economic theory that calls for a paradigm shift from the prevailing debt-based financial economy. Through a structured literature review and conceptual analysis, the paper explores the relationship between the traditional interest-based financial economy and economic injustice and instability. The paper then through an econometric analysis of data collected from 189 countries tests its conceptualised theory advocating a gradual transition from the deb-based financial economy. The results provide three important contributions. Firstly, the results contribute to the field of economics and finance by providing a conceptual and theoretical framework for examining the interaction between the financial economy and economic equity. The paper introduces a conceptualisation of what it coins as the Equitable Optimality Economic Theory, which replaces interest rate with profit rate. Secondly, the paper extends the debate in the literature about debt theories and its impact on the financial economy by arguing that a shift towards debt-balanced and eventually debt-free financial economy provides a more equitable and stable economic system. Thirdly, the econometric modelling demonstrates that such a change would lead to improved economic growth, reduced debt levels, enhanced financial stability, and the inherent nature of profit rates provides a natural buffer against economic downturns. The study concludes by proposing a practical roadmap for this economic transition in gradual and steady approach.

Traditionally, conditions of sustainability of the public debt have long been related quite exclusively to fiscal policy and to budgetary parameters. However, the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies regarding the fixation of the interest rate is fundamental. Indeed, a simple analytical modelling shows that if the nominal interest rate increases exponentially with the public debt, because of a default (credit) risk premium, if the confidence of investors is fundamental, conditions of sustainability of the public debt could be much more difficult to comply with. Indeed, if the interest rate is risk-free, values for which the public debt can be sustainable are less constraining if the long-term GDP growth rate is high, or if the long-term risk-free nominal interest rate is small. They are also less constraining if the country decides to turn to a non-negligible primary budget surplus in case of a high public debt. However, if the interest rate exponentially increases with the public debt level, in case of a significant importance of the default (credit) risk premium, these parameters have very limited consequences on sustainable and equilibrium public debt levels. The sustainable public debt that a government should target is then much smaller than in absence of this risk premium.

We study analytically the conflict of goals between stabilizing economic activity and public debt sustainability, for the fiscal authorities. In the short run, an active and expansionary fiscal policy, increasing public investment or reducing the labor taxation rate, is growth enhancing. However, as these short term fiscal policies also decrease government revenue and increase the public debt, budgetary and fiscal multipliers are reduced in the long run. In the framework of a potential ZLB constraint for monetary policy, an expansionary fiscal policy is thus appropriate only if long term labor and consumption taxation rates are small, and if the share of public expenditure in GDP is high. On the contrary, fiscal policy should be contractionary, in order to insure the sustainability of the long term public debt, if long term labor and consumption taxation rates are high. A contractionary fiscal policy is then also all the more appropriate as the sensitivity of government expenditure to the public debt is high, and as the labor share in the production function is high.

The recent interest rate policy decisions of the South African Reserve Bank have been criticized significantly by left-leaning political parties and civic society organisations for being anti-poor, anti-labour, and pro-capital because of their implications for household debt. Existing literature has established that interest rates and house prices are insignificant determinants of household debt dynamics in South Africa. Taking advantage of additional data for the period 2013-2022, and contrary to the previous studies, the paper maintains that house prices and the central bank policy rate play a crucial role in household debt dynamics. Applying a Markov Switching regression to quarterly data for the period 1981Q1 to 2022Q1, the paper finds that house prices and the policy rate have a significant influence on household debt dynamics. It establishes the existence of a ‘house price boom, low policy rate burden’ regime and a ‘high policy rate burden, low house price’ regime. The coexistence of the ‘house price boom’ and the ‘low policy rate’ explains the debt euphoria characterised by significant household leveraging.

This paper empirically investigates the relation between firm performance in corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the need and likelihood of external financing to test the predictions of agency and stakeholder theories. Empirical results from Logit, Linear Probability Model, OLS and Firm fixed effects regressions indicate that CSR is negatively related to the likelihood and level of external financing. Further analysis indicates that CSR has a negative and significant effect on both net equity issued (NEI) and net debt issued (NDI), the two components of external financing. Overall, the empirical results support the predictions of agency theory.

This study empirically examines the effect of corporate governance on the relation between CEO power and firm leverage. Results from OLS and industry fixed effects regressions show that CEO power is positively associated with firm leverage. However, this association is driven by the strength of corporate governance as powerful CEOs tend to choose higher levels of debt only when corporate governance is strong. When corporate governance is weak, CEO power does not seem to have any effect on firm leverage. Overall, results indicate that strong corporate governance mitigates the severity of manager-shareholder conflicts and induces powerful CEOs to choose higher leverage.

In this paper I will show that budget deficit (or fiscal deficit) is necessary to achieve full employment under constant prices or inflation, using a model of endogenous growth in which consumers hold money for the reason of liquidity and live forever. Budget deficit need not be offset by future budget surpluses. I consider the continuous time case by taking the limit of the discrete time case when the time interval approaches zero. A continuous time dynamic model seems to be more general than a discrete time model. When the actual budget deficit is greater (smaller) than the value which is necessary and sufficient for full employment under constant prices, an inflation (a recession) occurs. The main argument of this paper is that a growing economy requires the continuation of budget deficit, and that we should not think of paying off the resulting government debt with taxes.

Bank capital requirements would entail large social costs if they made resource allocation suboptimal and banking services costly by unduly limiting the banks’ ability to lend. This paper considers three main factors that may make capital requirements relevant, namely, deposit insurance subsidies, stock valuation errors, and tax shields derived from debt financing. The theoretical model analyzes the combined effects of the three factors on the banks’ incentives to make fairly priced loans, which should also be socially optimal loans. A key finding is that the long-term cost of capital requirements is likely to be very small when deposit insurance is underpriced. Increased funding costs resulting from higher capital requirements are absorbed by shareholders of banks, rather than passed on to borrowers. Under some reasonable assumptions, higher capital requirements improve resource allocation by countervailing distortionary effects of deposit insurance subsidies. Short-term adjustment costs can still be large, but it should be relatively easy to mitigate the short-term effects.