Open Access Journal Article

Observable and Unobservable Investment Information in Multiple Markets

by Yoshikazu Ishinagi a  and  Joonghwa Oh b,* orcid
a
Department of International Relations, Kobe City University of Foreign Studies, Kobe, Japan
b
Faculty of Business Administration, Setsunan University, Osaka, Japan
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
EAL  2024 3(3):60; https://doi.org/10.58567/eal03030001
Received: 23 January 2024 / Accepted: 27 March 2024 / Published Online: 29 March 2024
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Abstract

This study considers the effects of disclosure conditions on firms' investment decisions when facing an identical competitor in multiple markets. Assuming that there are congestion costs between multiple investments to reduce marginal cost for each market, this study focuses on the cases where the disclosure conditions may differ by market. Like previous studies on single Cournot competition, these results show that firms invest more in the observable investment markets than in the unobservable markets under symmetric disclosure conditions. However, firms invest more in the unobservable market if there are asymmetric disclosure conditions.

Keywords: Multimarket contact; cost-reducing investment; congestion cost; disclosure conditions;
Copyright: © 2024 by Ishinagi and Oh. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) (Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

Funding

Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (20K02057) , Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (20K02042)

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ACS Style
Ishinagi, Y.; Oh, J. Observable and Unobservable Investment Information in Multiple Markets. Economic Analysis Letters, 2024, 3, 60. https://doi.org/10.58567/eal03030001
AMA Style
Ishinagi Y, Oh J. Observable and Unobservable Investment Information in Multiple Markets. Economic Analysis Letters; 2024, 3(3):60. https://doi.org/10.58567/eal03030001
Chicago/Turabian Style
Ishinagi, Yoshikazu; Oh, Joonghwa 2024. "Observable and Unobservable Investment Information in Multiple Markets" Economic Analysis Letters 3, no.3:60. https://doi.org/10.58567/eal03030001
APA style
Ishinagi, Y., & Oh, J. (2024). Observable and Unobservable Investment Information in Multiple Markets. Economic Analysis Letters, 3(3), 60. https://doi.org/10.58567/eal03030001

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