This study considers the effects of disclosure conditions on firms' investment decisions when facing an identical competitor in multiple markets. Assuming that there are congestion costs between multiple investments to reduce marginal cost for each market, this study focuses on the cases where the disclosure conditions may differ by market. Like previous studies on single Cournot competition, these results show that firms invest more in the observable investment markets than in the unobservable markets under symmetric disclosure conditions. However, firms invest more in the unobservable market if there are asymmetric disclosure conditions.

Forty-five UK universities were approached, drawn from 21 universities whose client technology/knowledge-transfer firms perform consistently well (category 1 universities), and 24 universities whose client technology/knowledge-transfer firms perform consistently poorly (category 2). Contact was established with staff in the Technology Transfer Office (TTO) or similar department, resulting in 72 persons identified as either “leading” TTO staff or “operational” TTO staff. These individuals were subject to semi-structured interviews around a 10-point questionnaire to arrive at consensus opinions. Results indicate that independently of whether the university is regarded as “entrepreneurial” or not, the TTOs of category 1 universities are more ambidextrous than those of category 2 universities.