Protection in DRM and pricing strategies for digital products considering quality degradation

In this paper, we develop a model in which a monopolistic firm manufactures and sells a digital product, by incorporating digital rights management (DRM), quality degradation of pirated products, and government copyright enforcement into the consumer’s utility function. We determine the monopolist’s optimal pricing strategies and the appropriate DRM protection level through mathematical deduction. Our results show that when the government copyright enforcement is moderate and the quality of pirated products is relatively high, implementing a DRM system is optimal for the monopolist. However, in most other cases, DRM-free is better for the monopolist. This result may explain why DRM is not very popular in some industries. Our results suggest that choosing the right price, focusing on content innovation, and weakening DRM protection may be a better strategy for firms now. The results also indicate that DRM-free may be more prominent in the digital music industry than in the software and video games industries.